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Abstract:
This paper investigates whether Italian companies that cross-list in the United States
between 1993 and 2005 show (i) a change in their internal policies as anticipated by the
bonding hypothesis, (ii) an increase in market value, or (iii) an increase in the access to capital
funds. We use the unique environment created by the 1998 Draghi reform which significantly
improved the protection of Italian listed companies’ minority shareholders and we further
examine the impact of legislated changes in corporate governance in Italy on the decision of
Italian companies to cross-list in the United States.
Our results indicate that following the Draghi reform (i) firms that cross-list in the United
States modify their dividend and cash policies as anticipated by the bonding hypothesis.
Contrary to prior research, (ii) we do not find evidence that cross-listing serves to enhance
shareholder value or (iii) is used as a vehicle to more easily access capital funds either before
or after the domestic corporate governance is improved.
The results of this study provide evidence that country level legislative innovations
intended to enhance a weak corporate governance system can be a valid and effective
substitute to the bonding mechanism by providing an alternative signal of a firm’s quality.
Keywords: Italy, ADR, cross-listing, investor protection, regulation change, corporate
governance, bonding hypothesis, signaling.
Data availability: The data are available from public sources.
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This paper investigates whether Italian companies that cross-list in the United States show
(i) a change in their internal policies as anticipated by the bonding hypothesis, (ii) an increase
in market value, or (iii) an increase in the access to capital funds. We answer this question in
both the weak corporate governance environment before the 1998 Draghi reform and also
after this shareholder protection reform. In this way we provide evidence of the impact of
corporate governance reform on the behavior of firms cross-listed in the United States and
eventual changes in their actions (cross-list vs. not cross-list) after the incentives to crosslisting changed substantially.
A foreign firm can cross-list its shares in the United States capital markets by either listing
their shares directly on an exchange2 or by using the American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
system. ADRs are issued by custodian banks and trade on an organized exchange3, over the
counter market, or on Portal. Reese and Weisbach (2001) and Karolyi (2005) present a
thorough explanation of the mechanics of cross-listing and we refer the reader to their
manuscripts for further review of that process. We include all forms of cross-listing of Italian
firms in our sample (type I, II, and III ADRs) as the quality signaling benefits are roughly
similar for all types, even if normative requirements are different.

1

We would like to thank participants at the 4th Workshop on Accounting and Regulation - EIASM, Siena (Italy),
AAA International Accounting Section 2007 Midyear Meeting – Charleston, SC, University of Tennessee, Ball
State University, the University at Albany SUNY, and Mara Faccio (Purdue University) for their helpful
comments and suggestions. We also thank Bruce Behn and Ronald Shrieves for their guidance. All mistakes are
our own.
2
This method is primarily used by Canadian and Israeli firms.
3
Including NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX.
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Previous research analyzes groups of non-United States countries in order to identify
cross-listing motivation and outcomes. These studies find strong evidence that when firms
cross-list: transactions costs decrease (Tinic and West 1974; Smith and Sofianos 1997;
Domowitz et al. 1998; Foerster and Karolyi 1993, 1998); disclosure requirements increase
resulting in higher stock prices (Cantale 1997; Fuerst 1998); and firm value increases, as
measured by Tobin’s Q (Doidge et al. 2004). However, previous research provides only weak
evidence that foreign issuers cross-list in the United States in order to protect shareholder
rights (Reese and Weisbach 2001). Moreover, previous research provides mixed results
regarding the effect of cross-listing on dividends, a component of shareholder value.
Specifically, Jensen (1986) argues that managers have an incentive to lower dividends to
retain resources within the company in order to support higher salaries, investment in risky
projects and perquisite consumption. La Porta and Lopez-De Silanes (2000) find that firms
operating in countries with higher shareholder protection pay higher dividends than firms in
countries with weaker shareholder protection. These theories seem to indicate that dividends
are mainly a “benefit” for minority shareholders and a “cost” for management and majority
shareholders.

In contrast, Faccio et al. (2001) find that ex-ante firm value is lower in

countries with weak shareholder protection, and for that reason higher dividends are required
to offset the lower firm value. One of the limitations inherent in this stream of research is
that, to date, the authors use groups of countries, thereby averaging the differences among
individual countries and exposing the results to the risk of a missing, correlated variable at the
country level.
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Our paper seeks to add to the existing literature by examining cross-listed firms from only
one country. This research design allows us to directly examine the effects of cross-listing
without the confounding effects of averaging groups of countries with different economic,
political, social, corporate governance, and legal environments. In this way we are better able
to evaluate the effects of cross-listing and of changes in corporate governance on the firms in
our sample, with fewer confounding factors.

We chose Italy, specifically, because this

country provides an excellent setting in which to examine our research questions. Indeed, as
several previous studies have indicated, the domestic Italian shareholder protection
environment has been historically weak (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 2000; Faccio and
Lang 2002). In 1998 the Draghi reform dramatically improved shareholder protection for
domestically listed firms (Dyck and Zingales 2004). This unique setting allows us to add to
the existing literature by examining the change in cross-listing behavior and corporate policy
decisions surrounding this significant legislated corporate governance reform.
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold: first, we evaluate three different effects of
cross-listing in the United States by a firm domiciled in a country with a weak corporate
governance system without the confounding effects of the differences in the economic,
political, social, corporate governance, and legal environments; second, we study the effects
of the Italian corporate governance reform on the corporate decisions of listed firms. The
results can be helpful to other countries with weak corporate governance systems that are
evaluating the possible benefits of legislating corporate governance reform.
Research has shown that civil law countries, in general, have weaker corporate
governance systems in the form of lower shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 2000).
5

Additionally, within the civil law countries, French civil law countries (including Italy)
provide even less protection for minority shareholders (Reese and Weisbach 2001) than do
other civil law countries. Specifically, previous literature (La Porta et al. 1998) indicates that
Italy, before the Draghi reform, was historically characterized by a low level of shareholder
protection. Hence, ex ante 1998, we argue that one of the incentives for Italian firms with
high quality corporate governance to cross-list in the United States is the desire to signal to
the market their own “high quality” by bonding to the legal system of a country with stronger
shareholder protection laws. To test this hypothesis we look at two indicators - the dividend
ratio and cash balance to total assets ratio. Previous literature (Zhang 2005) has adopted both
ratios as proxies to measure the level of protection of minority shareholders. The bonding
hypothesis predicts that cross-listing firms, because they are bonded to a legal system where
the protection of minority shareholders is stronger, can afford to pay lower dividends and
maintain higher cash balances than non-cross-listed firms. Our results provide support for
this hypothesis. Cross-listed firms in our sample pay lower dividends and maintain higher
cash to total assets ratios than do the non-cross-listed firms, confirming that when the
domestic corporate governance system is weak, bonding to a stronger corporate governance
system allows companies to reduce dividends paid.
However, following the 1998 corporate governance reform, the statistically significant
difference in the dividends paid between cross-listed companies and non-cross-listed
companies disappears.

This result, again, supports the bonding hypothesis: as the

improvements in the domestic corporate governance system level the playing field, crosslisted companies can no longer afford to pay lower dividends than do non-cross-listed
6

companies. In contrast, the cash to total assets ratio (untabulated results) is still statistically
different between cross-listing (higher) and non cross-listing (lower) companies after the 1998
Draghi reform. Overall, we can argue that one of the effects of the corporate governance
reform in Italy was to eliminate the incentive for companies to signal their corporate
governance quality by bonding to a legal system where shareholders’ rights were more
strongly protected.
Moreover, we use this unique regulatory change at a country level to test whether crosslisted Italian companies were able to deliver to their shareholders a higher firm value measured by both Tobin’s Q and the annual return on investment4 - than firms not crosslisting. We measure this effect both ex ante and ex post 1998. Contrary to previous literature,
our results do not indicate a consistent difference between firm valuations of cross-listed and
non-cross-listed firms, nor do we find any difference in firm valuations before and after the
Draghi reform. Based on these results, Italian firms neither experience increases in firm value
following cross-listing in the United States, nor following the legislated improvement in the
local corporate governance system. One likely reason for the differences in our results from
other cross-country studies is that we examine cross-listing and corporate governance changes
in only one country, with homogeneous country level factors, thus avoiding confounding
effects that are difficult to disentangle and omitted correlated variables.
Lastly, we used this unique setting to test whether Italian companies that cross-list in the
United States experienced an easier access to capital funds than companies that do not crosslist. In order to test this hypothesis, we examined the increases in the number of outstanding
4

We calculate return on investment both with and without dividends with the same results.
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shares before and after the cross-listing event, as well as ex ante and ex post the 1998 Draghi
reform. Contrary to prior literature, our results indicate that there is no difference in the year
over year change in shares outstanding for cross-listed firms versus non-cross-listed firms.
There also appears to be no difference in the year over year change in the shares outstanding
for firms before the 1998 corporate governance reform and after the reform. These results
indicate that companies do not appear to cross-list in the United States in order to gain access
to capital investors either before or after the 1998 corporate governance reform. Again, our
results may differ from other studies because we examine data from one country, eliminating
other country level confounding factors.
Overall, the results of our study indicate that countries with weak corporate governance
systems can use legislation to improve shareholder protection and thus reduce the incentives
for local firms to cross-list in the United States in order to signal their quality as anticipated
by the bonding hypothesis. We find no evidence that Italian firms, cross-listing in the United
States, enhance their shareholder value or issue more stock. These results are particularly
meaningful to legislators because they indicate that a government can take action to improve
domestic corporate governance and thereby reduce the cross-listing incentives for domestic
firms. Additionally, firms that are domiciled in countries that introduce a stronger corporate
governance system may be able to avoid the costs of cross-listing. We leave it to future
research to determine if the costs of cross-listing are exceeded by the costs of compliance with
the changes implemented under the Draghi reform.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the
relevant previous literature. Section 3 includes the exposition and argumentation of our
8

hypotheses. Section 4 describes our sample and data. Section 5 presents our empirical results
and Section 6 summarizes our conclusions and offers suggestions for future research.

2. Review of previous literature
2.1 Separation of ownership and control literature
Berle and Means (1932), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the separation
between ownership and control of a company results in agency conflicts between owners
(shareholders) and agents (management). The root of the agency problem is the ability of
management to make decisions that benefit themselves at the cost of shareholders, while
shareholders are not able to completely monitor the actions and performance of management.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the presence of large shareholders may offer a partial
solution to the agency problem as large shareholders would have both the motivation and
ability to monitor management, thus enhancing firm efficiency through the reduction of
agency costs.
However, in addition to the positive effect of reduced agency costs, large or dominant
shareholders can also create the negative consequence known as the entrenchment effect;
Dyck and Zingales (2004, 2002), suggest that large shareholders are able to divert corporate
resources from other (minority) shareholders through self dealing (i.e. purchase and sale of
assets are common examples of self-dealing) or tunneling (transferring resources out of the
company) (Johnson et al. 2000). These authors offer evidence that Italy is an excellent
example of a legal environment in which, before the Draghi reform, minority shareholders’
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rights were only weakly protected, resulting in obvious instances of expropriation of minority
shareholders by majority shareholders5.
Previous research has documented the existence of control chains and pyramid structures6
as tools for dominant shareholders to achieve control (voting) rights larger than their
ownership (cash flow) rights7. These control rights can be used to dominate a firm to a
greater extent than is justified by direct ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) identify
several methods used by managers and dominant shareholders to expropriate company
resources

from

minority

shareholders:

excessive

management

salaries,

perquisite

consumption, extra dividends to certain share classes, self dealing, tunneling, and outright
theft. These types of expropriation by dominant shareholders are possible because in these
companies, either directly or indirectly, the dominant shareholder controls the firm’s board of
directors (Dahya et al. 2005). Previous research has repeatedly indicated that in the absence
of strong shareholder protection, management and dominant shareholders each have both the

5

Johnson et al. (2000) present an Italian company where the dominant shareholders successfully expropriated
wealth from the minority shareholders. Anguissola and Mignani, are minority shareholders of Marcilli, an
Italian machinery maker. The controlling shareholder of the company is Sarcem, a Swiss machinery maker, who
owns 51% of Marcilli. Sarcem precluded Marcilli from directly exporting its products, charged a very high
markup for Marcilli products it sold, and sold Marcilli products under its own trademark, overcharging Marcilli.
The court declined to appoint a judicial investigation because Marcilli’s president had duty of care to Sarcem,
the controlling shareholder. This case illustrates the risks borne by minority shareholders of Italian companies
before the Draghi reform.
6
Pyramid structures are defined as follows. Firm Y is said to be controlled through pyramiding if it has an
ultimate owner who controls Y indirectly through another corporation that it does not wholly control. For
example, if a family owns 15% of Firm X (which owns 20% of Firm Y), then Firm Y is controlled through a
pyramid at the 10% threshold. However, at the 20% threshold, we would say that Firm Y is directly controlled
by Firm X (which is widely held at the 20% threshold) and no pyramiding would be recorded. If Firm X holds
100% of Firm Y, then again there is no pyramid. Cross holding structures are defined as follows. Cross
holdings: Firm Y is controlled by a cross-holding at the 10% (or 20%) threshold if Firm X holds a stake in Firm
Y of at least 10% (or 20%), and Y holds a stake in Firm X of at least 10% (or 20%), or if firm Y directly holds
at least 10% (or 20%) of its own stock.
7
Control rights are measured by voting rights a shareholder can exercise in a shareholders’ meeting, while the
cash flow rights are equal to the equity share owned by the shareholder.
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motivation and the ability to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (La Porta et al.
2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Johnson et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2002).
Faccio (2002) identified a pattern of significant differences between dominant shareholder
voting rights and cash flow rights in five Western European countries including Italy (as well
as Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). These differences signify an increased risk
of loss-of-value to minority shareholders.

2.2 Dividend Policy literature
Existing literature (Faccio et al. 2001; La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes 2000; Jensen 1986)
offers mixed results regarding the effect of the excess control of large dominant shareholders
over dividend policies. In general there are two views: the country-level view and the firmlevel view.
At a country level, Jensen (1986) argues that managers may use lower dividend payments
to retain resources that can be employed for perquisite consumption, excess salaries, or
projects that benefit managers or increase private benefit of control for dominant shareholders
at the expense of the other shareholders. Higher dividend payments, indeed, force firms to
raise the funds they need from capital markets, who then may become a monitoring
mechanism over managers and controlling shareholders.

Dominant owners with higher

control (voting) rights than cash flow (ownership) rights have an interest in paying lower
dividends, since they receive only a small fraction of the paid dividends. Similarly, at a
country level, La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (2000) provide evidence that firms in countries
with stronger shareholder protection pay higher dividends.
11

At a firm level, the bonding hypothesis suggests that investors discount ex ante the value
of the firm due to agency concerns and the resulting higher risk to minority shareholders.
Companies, however, can counter these concerns by bonding themselves to a stronger
shareholder environment and thereby reducing the agency costs anticipated by minority
shareholders. In this way, if agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders are
reduced by cross-listing in the United States, a cross-listed company can lower its dividend
payments.

Faccio et al. (2001) offer both theory and empirical evidence regarding the

bonding hypothesis and its effect on firms’ dividend policy. Specifically, they find a positive
association between the excess control held by the dominant shareholders and dividend
payment. These authors argue that investors associate dominant shareholders with higher
agency costs and therefore discount the value of the firm ex ante. To make up for this
perceived lower firm value, companies distribute higher dividends, as a bonding device.
We expect the firm level results to be relevant to our study as all of our firms are from
one country, Italy, thus eliminating the country-level effects that were present in other studies.

2.3 Cross-listing literature
In the last ten years the number of companies that cross-list their shares in the United
States market has increased tenfold8, with a peak in 1996 and a downturn at the beginning of
this decade coinciding with regulatory changes9 that have made listing in the US less
attractive (Zhu et al. 2007).

Finance, accounting, and legal literature provide different

8

Non-U.S. companies listing or issuing their shares on the United States market through the American
Depository Receipts (ADR) program went from 158 in the early ’90 to 2172 at July 2007 (data from Bank of
New York ADR website: www. adrbny.com).
9
US Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30, 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745).
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explanations and suggest different relevant factors for the development of the cross-listing
activity.
Biddle and Saudagaran (1991) identify both the costs and benefits of listing on a foreign
stock exchange. They identify several financial benefits to cross-listing including: a reduction
in the firm’s cost of capital, lower transaction costs, lower systematic risk, and lower required
rate of return by investors. Moreover, companies listing on a foreign stock exchange gain
marketing, public relations, and political benefits. The costs include the accounting and
regulatory costs of foreign listing, specifically: compliance with foreign accounting reporting
requirements (in the United States, generally accepted accounting principles or GAAP),
modification of auditing procedures, changing the frequency of financial reporting, increasing
financial disclosure10, and the upfront costs of the initial registration.
The market segmentation hypothesis emphasizes that world markets are separated by
cultural, financial, legal, language, and fiscal barriers. Capital market integration theories
(Alexander et al. 1987) argue that removing those barriers would help to share the risk among
investors, thereby reducing the expected returns demanded by investors and the transaction
costs, while increasing the stock prices. Non-United States companies can remove these
investment barriers by cross-listing on a United States exchange. Indeed, empirical research
has found a significant decrease in the cost of capital for cross-listing companies (Errunza and
Miller 2000).

10

Licht (2003) notes that in the United States, current reporting rules require that companies disclose potentially
sensitive information such as remuneration, related party transaction, stock-option data, and names of
shareholders with more than 5% of the issuer’s voting securities. These rules can reduce managers’ control and
financial and non-financial benefits.
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Some other researchers suggest increased liquidity as another explanation for the decision
to cross-list. The United States market is more liquid, and thus can alleviate capital constraints
that may exist in a domestic market thereby making capital available to firms at a lower cost.
In a single-country study, Davis-Friday (2005) provides evidence that Mexican companies
cross-listed in the United States in order to overcome the capital constraints that existed in
Mexico following the devaluation of that currency in 1995.
Another stream of research in the law and finance disciplines, defines the bonding
hypothesis as a motivation for cross-listing in order to signal the “quality” of a firm. Where
the legal protection of minority shareholders is weak, it is more difficult for companies to
raise external capital (La Porta et al. 1997). To alleviate this problem, firms that desire
external capital can bond themselves to a higher investor protection system by cross-listing
their shares in the United States, because of mandatory high quality disclosure requirements,
SEC enforcement actions, and shareholder litigation law, all of which make expropriation of
minority shareholders by dominant shareholders and/or by management more difficult
(Coffee 1999).

Empirical research has consistently supported the bonding hypothesis.

Doidge et al. (2004) provide evidence that at the end of 1997, foreign companies with shares
cross-listed on major United States exchanges have Tobin’s Q ratios significantly higher than
companies that do not cross-list. These authors suggest that cross-listing in the United States
reduces the opportunities for dominant shareholders and management to expropriate private
benefits, thereby enhancing the value of the firm. This effect is more pronounced for firms
that are based in countries with weaker investor protection laws.
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Within this line of research, analytical models consider the decision to cross-list as both a
signal from dominant shareholders and managers of private information about their firm’s
“quality” to outside investors, and as an action designed to bond the firm to a higher quality
disclosure environment.
Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002) examine the motivation of European companies’ to
cross-list, relating the cross-listing decision to the characteristics of the destination exchanges
(and countries) relative to those of the home exchange (and country).

They find that

European companies appear more likely to cross-list in more liquid or larger markets, and in
markets in which several companies from their industry already cross-list. They also find a
higher likelihood of cross-listing in countries with stronger investor protection, and more
efficient courts and bureaucracy, but not with more stringent accounting standards.
Moreover, they suggest that a United States listing is a natural choice for high-growth and
high-tech companies, while European exchanges are chosen by companies with a strong
historical record of profitability.
Previous research has provided only weak evidence of equity increases following crosslistings when examining groups of foreign companies (Reese and Weisbach 2001).

2.4 Country Background
Italy has historically had one of the weakest shareholder legal protection environments
among the world’s industrialized countries. In the well known study by La Porta et al. (1998),
Italy emerged with an antidirector rights score equal to 1 (in a scale from 1 to 6). In 1998
Italy went through a radical corporate governance reform, also known as the Draghi reform.
15

Among new regulations, this reform made it easier for minority shareholders to sue the
company’s management11. Furthermore, to reduce the asymmetry between cash flow and
voting rights, this reform made it mandatory for anyone who acquires 30% or more of the
voting shares of a listed company to bid for 100% of the shares.

Before the reform,

shareholders representing at least 20% of the equity issued could ask for a shareholders
meeting; after the reform, the threshold was lowered to 10% (or less, if the by-laws state a
lower amount). The same percentages are required for shareholders’ proposals at the meeting.
Overall, this reform significantly improved the corporate governance of Italian firms
specifically related to minority shareholder rights and protections.
One of the expected consequences of this reform was to limit the ability of dominant
shareholders to extract private benefits from the company. Despite the effort to avoid the new
rules whenever possible 12, there is evidence that the 1998 Draghi reform was able to deliver
the desired results: Dyck and Zingales (2004) found that before 1998 the average value of
private benefits13 of control for dominant shareholders in listed Italian companies was 47
percent, while after 1998 it was reduced to a mere 6 percent.

11

Until 1998, individual and minority shareholders were not allowed to sue the directors for damages suffered
by the company. After the reform, a minority representing at least 5% of the total issued equity in a listed
company can start a derivative suit against the company’s directors.

12

In Pirelli Spa, the controlling stake was reduced from 50 percent to around 30 percent. In the disperse
ownership cases of Olivetti and SNIA-BPD, coalitions of shareholders worked together to create controlling
stakes just below 30 percent. (Bianchi et al. 1998)
13
They use the Barclay and Holderness (1989) method to infer the value of private benefits of control for 39
countries. When a control block exchanges hands, they measure the difference between the price paid by the
acquirer and the price quoted on the market the day after the sale’s announcement. This difference is called
control premium and is used to measure the private benefits of controlling the company.
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3. Hypotheses development
Our basic research question examines which, if any, of the following motivations for
Italian firms to cross-list in the United States are supported by the data: bonding a weak
shareholder protection environment to a stronger legal protection environment, the desire to
increase shareholder value, or the desire to more easily access equity capital.
Previous literature clearly identifies the United States legal environment as one that
provides strong legal protection to minority shareholders. For this reason, we consider the
decision to cross-list in the United States as a proxy for the decision to bond a company to a
stronger shareholder protection environment. Moreover, researchers arguing in favor of the
bonding hypothesis, provided evidence that dividends paid, at the firm-level, are lower after
cross-listing (Faccio et al. 2001). In this paper we analyze data at the firm-level, within the
same country, and therefore expect the effects of cross-listing on a company’s dividend policy
to conform to the bonding hypothesis. In the same way, previous literature provides evidence
that firm-level cash holdings are negatively correlated with the degree of legal protection of
minority shareholders (Dittmar et al. 2003), and thus are also correlated with the firm’s crosslisting decisions. This literature leads us to Hypothesis 1a:

H1a: (alternative form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (crosslisting in the United States) results in lower dividends paid to investors and a higher cash
balance to total assets ratio.
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Since the enactment of the Draghi reform in 1998, the corporate governance system,
specifically, the legal protection of minority shareholders rights, in Italy has improved (Dyck
and Zingales 2004). Hence, as previous literature suggests (Jensen 1986; Zhang 2005; La
Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes 2000), we would expect an increase in dividend payments to
investors and a lower level of cash holdings after 1998, ceteris paribus. Hypothesis 1b is as
follows:

H1b: (alternate form) Following the Draghi reform, all companies in the sample will pay
higher dividends to investors and have a lower cash balance to total assets ratio due to
the improved domestic shareholder protection setting in Italy.

We also test the combined effect of the decision to cross-list in the United States and the
Draghi reform on the dividend policy and cash balances of Italian companies in order to
determine if the benefits offered by bonding is greater than (or less than) the corporate
governance improvement in Italy subsequent to the 1998 Draghi reform. Hypothesis 1c is as
follows:

H1c: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (crosslisting in the United States) after the Draghi Reform results in higher/lower dividends
paid to investors and higher/lower cash balance to total assets ratios for both cross-listed
and non-cross-listed firms.
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Additionally, based on results provided by extant literature (La Porta et al. 2002; Doidge
et al. 2004), we expect the market value of the company, measured by Tobin’s Q and returns
to investors (excluding dividends), to be higher for cross-listed companies.

Tobin’s Q

measures the market value per dollar of replacement costs of tangible assets, while the return
to investors measures the annual increase in the market price of a company’s shares
(excluding dividends). Assuming rational and efficient financial markets, stock prices
incorporate all positive and negative news about the company’s expected future cash flows,
including the decision to cross-list. We state these Hypotheses in 2a, b and c:

H2a: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (crosslisting in the United States) results in higher firm market value as measured by returns to
investors and Tobin’s Q.

H2b: (alternate form) Following the Draghi reform all companies in the sample
experience higher firm market value as measured by returns to investors and Tobin’s Q.

H2c: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (crosslisting in the United States) after the Draghi Reform result in increased firm market value
as measured by returns to investors and Tobin’s Q for cross-listed firms as compared to
non-cross-listed firms.

19

Another motivation for cross-listing in the United States is easier access to capital
funding. Previous research indicates that separate from the above motivations for crosslisting, firms that cross-list subsequently increase equity issues, regardless of the shareholder
protection environment (Reese and Weisbach 2001). Based on these results, we expect crosslisted firms to show a greater year over year increase in the number of shares outstanding than
do non-cross-listed firms. We further expect that the relation will continue following the
Draghi reform. We will additionally test if the respective increase in shares outstanding is
different between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms after the Draghi reform although
previous research does not offer us directional guidance for this hypothesis. We test these
Hypotheses in 3a, 3b and 3c below:

H3a: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (crosslisting in the United States) results in increases in the year over year shares outstanding
(as compared to non-cross-listed firms).

H3b: (alternate form) Following the Draghi reform, all firms in the sample
increase/decrease year over year the number of shares outstanding.

H3c: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (crosslisting in the United States) after the Draghi Reform increases/decreases year over year
the number of shares outstanding.

20

4. Sample Selection and Data
4.1 Sample selection
We gathered financial and accounting data from the Global Vantage (Compustat) database
and ADR data from Citibank American Depositary Receipt Services14, Bank of New York
ADR website15 and JP Morgan ADR website16. As of October, 2006, 46 Italian ADRs were
listed on the Citibank American Depositary Receipt Services website. Table 1 lists all of the
Italian firms cross-listed in the United States. It is important to note that while Table 1 lists
different classes of shares of the same company as different ADRs programs (i.e., FIAT
S.P.A. cross-lists 3 different ADR programs),17 to avoid the violation of the assumptions of
the OLS regression model, the sample used to estimate our OLS regressions includes only one
ADR program for each company-year.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 lists the capital raising events for all of the Italian firms cross-listed in the
United States.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
For our sample period, 1993 to 2005, we include all ADRs for which data are
available on Global Vantage (Global Issue and Global Commercial/Industrial). Our
dataset includes a total of 2,365 firm-year observations.

14

http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp
http://www.adrbny.com
16
http:// www.adr.com
17
Each class of share assigns to the shareholder different voting and cash flow rights (similarly to class A and B
shares in the U.S.).
15
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To test our first group of hypotheses, we use the ratio of total dividend payments to total
assets at the beginning of the period to quantify a firm’s dividend policy (Zhang 2005). We
also examine each firm’s cash holding policy as a dependent variable proxied by the log of
the cash ratio, measured as the sum of cash and cash equivalents divided by net assets.18
In our second group of hypotheses, we analyze the effect of cross-listing on firm value
and firm performance. As a proxy for firm value we use the simplified version of Tobin’s Q
originally developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997)19. To minimize the effects of outliers in
the regression analysis, we perform the same analyses winsorizing all of the financial
variables at 1% and 99%. Our (untabulated) results are consistent both with and without
winsorizing our variables.
Finally, in order to make shares and stock prices directly comparable through time20, we
use Cumulative Adjustment Factors (CAF) from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
We calculate adjusted stock price and adjusted shares outstanding by multiplying numbers
from the Global Vantage Global Issue database with the CAF provided by WRDS. We then
calculate the value of returns to investors (with and without dividends), market value, and
Tobin’s Q based on those adjusted observation.

Results (untabulated) of the additional

analyses are the same as the unadjusted values.

18

Net assets is computed as the difference between total assets and cash plus cash equivalents.
Tobin’s Q is defined as a firm’s market value per dollar of replacement costs of tangible assets. The higher a
firm’s Tobin’s Q, the higher the market value of each dollar of replacement cost of tangible assets (or, more
simply, each dollar of total assets). The original Tobin’s Q model is calculated as the ratio: "market value of the
firm" over "the reproduction cost of its assets.” There are some papers that use a more simplified procedure in
which Tobin’s Q is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Market value of
assets is calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (total shares outstanding
multiplied by the price per share outstanding) less the sum of book value of common equity.
20
In this way we adjust for stock splits and other events that affect the firm’s capital structure.
19
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4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics for all of the accounting and financial variables for
our complete sample, and separately for companies with cross-listings in the United States
and for those companies without cross-listings. Results indicate that cross-listed companies
compared with non-cross-listed companies have, on average, higher sales volume (12.8 vs.
2.2 billion euro), net income (145.0 vs. 60.4 million euro), current assets (9.7 vs. 1.7 billion
euro), goodwill (1.9 vs. 0.3 billion euro), retained earnings (258.0 vs. 85.0 million euro), and
market value (5.0 vs. 1.2 billion euro). However, cross-listed companies are characterized by
a lower growth rate (0.12 vs. 0.47), Tobin’s Q value (1.22 vs. 1.52), and dividend ratio
(0.0052 vs. 0.0081). No correlation or collinearity problems were identified.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]

4.3 Research Design
We use several statistical analyses to test our hypotheses. First, we perform two simple
univariate analyses to test if the means and medians of the dependent variables for the
complete sample (1) before and (2) after the 1998 reform and for companies (1) that were
cross-listed and (2) those that were not cross-listed are significantly different. Second, we run
OLS regressions to test the hypotheses, controlling for other variables that previous literature
has found relevant in explaining the cross-listing decisions. Previous literature, for instance,
identifies one of the possible reasons to cross-list in a more liquid market is a need to access
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financial capital (Pagano et al. 2002). For this reason, in our model we control for companies
with high growth opportunities by including the Growth independent variable in our models21.

4.3.1 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in the model are the dividend ratio, cash holdings ratio, leverage,
returns to investors with and without dividends, Tobin’s Q, and the year over year increase in
the number of shares outstanding.
We define the dividend ratio as the ratio of total dividend payments divided by total
assets. We calculate the cash holding ratio as the sum of cash and cash equivalents divided by
net assets.

Net assets are computed as the total assets less cash and cash equivalents.

Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
We compute the actual return to investors with dividends as:
Re t t =

Pt − Pt −1 + Divt
Pt −1

(1)

where Rett is the return to investors at time t, Pt is the price of the stock at time t, and Divt is
the dividend per share at time t. Returns without dividends are calculated as:

 Pt

Re t t = 
− 1
 Pt −1 

(2)

We compute the Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the sum of total book value of debt plus the
market value of equity over the total book value of assets. Finally, we calculate the year over

21

The growth ratio is calculated as the increase in sales between year t-1 and t, divided by total sales for year t-1.
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year increase in shares outstanding as the difference between shares outstanding in year t and
in year t-1, adjusting the value to take into account stock splits and other events that affect the
firm’s capital structure.

5. Empirical results
Our univariate results from examining the dependent variables before and after the 1998
corporate governance reform show that, on average, the dividend ratio is statistically higher
before the reform, while the value of the Tobin’s Q is statistically lower. The return to
investors without dividends is, is not statistically significantly different before the reform
versus after the reform.
Our univariate results from examining the dependent variables for firms that cross-listed
in the United States versus firms that did not cross-list shows that companies that cross-list are
characterized, on average, by a lower dividend ratio. There is no significant difference in the
returns without dividends and Tobin’s Q between the two groups.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Our multivariate regressions allow us to test our hypotheses while controlling for certain
variables that previous research has found relevant in explaining the decision to cross-list in
the United States.

We use the following model to test our hypotheses (firm and time

subscripts are omitted for simplicity):

Dependent = α + β 0 NetIncEU + β1Growth + β 2 After 98 + β 3CaEU + β 4GoodEU +

β 5 Re tEarEU + β 6 MktVal + β 7TobinQ + β 8CrossListUS + β 9CrossListUS * After 98
25

(3)

where the dependent variable (defined at Table 6) Dependent varies for different models.
Dependent is equal to Divratio in model (1), LogCashRatio in model (2), Leverage in model
(3), TobinQ in model (4), Retwithout in model (5), MktVal in model (6), and Diffshare in
model (7). Divratio is dividend ratio, calculated as the ratio of total dividend payments to
total assets. LogCashRatio is the log of the ratio of total cash to total assets minus cash.
Leverage is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. TobinQ is equal to the market
value of assets divided by the book value of total assets, where market value of assets is
calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (total shares
outstanding multiplied by the value of shares outstanding) less the sum of the book value of
common equity.

Untabulated results show qualitatively similar results for the value of

TobinQ where the variable was not winsorized. RetWithout is the returns to investors without
dividends (computed as Retwithout=(Pt/Pt-1)-1).

Untabulated results show qualitatively

similar results if we adopt returns to investors including dividends. MktVal is equal to the
total shares outstanding times the price of a share on the market at the end of the year (in
euro). Diffshare is the difference in the number of shares outstanding between year t and year
t-1 for company i. NetIncEU is net income in euro. Growth is calculated as the increase in
sales between year t-1 and t, divided by total sales for year t-1. CrossListUS is a indicator
variable equal to 1 if the shares of the company are listed on a United States stock exchange, 0
otherwise. CaEU is current assets in euro. GoodEU is goodwill in euro. RetEarEU is
retained earnings in euro.
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We test Hypothesis 1 with the first and the second models, Hypothesis 2 with the fourth
and fifth model, and Hypothesis 3 with the sixth and the seventh model. Model 3 helps to
clarify if the reform and/or the cross-listing on the United States market are associated with a
change in the company financing policies, and an increase in the importance of equity
financing over debt financing, or vice-versa.
In Model 1, the dependent variable is the company’s dividend ratio (results in Table 6
Column 1) and we expect to find a negative coefficient, β8, for the CrossListUS indicator
variable and a positive coefficient, β2, for the After98 indicator variable, confirming the
bonding hypothesis described above. We do not have an expectation for the sign of the
coefficient of the interaction variable, β9, since the sign depends on which of the two effects,
the cross-listing or the reform effect, is dominant. Our results show that there is a significant
and negative coefficient estimate for β9 (-0.006, t value of 2.80), while β2 is not statistically
different from zero. In accordance with the bonding hypothesis, our results indicate that
companies reduce their dividends paid to shareholders after the cross-listing event, but they
do not change their dividend policy after the 1998 reform.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Model 2 tests if the company’s cash policy is affected by either the cross-listing of shares
on the United States market or by the corporate governance reform. We expect results
consistent with the bonding hypothesis explained above: a positive coefficient estimate for the
CrossListUS indicator variable (β8) and a negative coefficient for the After98 indicator
variable (β2). Under the bonding hypothesis, companies bonded to a stronger shareholder
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legal environment can distribute lower dividends without concern that investors will discount
their firm’s value on the market due to agency conflicts between majority and minority
shareholders. Model 2 results (Table 6, Column 2) show that both of the coefficients of
interest are statistically significant and have the expected signs, thereby providing evidence in
support of the bonding hypothesis. In both Model 1 and Model 2 estimates for the interaction
term (β9) is not statistically different from zero, indicating that after the 1998 reform there is
no significant incremental difference in dividends paid or cash holding policies between
companies cross-listed in the United States and the rest of the companies in the sample. As a
result, the cash to total assets ratio of cross-listed firms remains higher than that of non-crosslisted firms even after the 1998 Draghi reform (untabulated results).
Overall the results for Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c indicate that companies that cross-list
their shares in the United States have significantly lower dividends and higher cash holdings
than non-cross-listing companies. These results are consistent for the whole sample and
whether we restrict the sample to either pre-1998 data or to post-1998 data.
Hypothesis 2 (Models 4 and 5) tests the market reaction (measured with returns to
investors and with Tobin’s Q) to both the 1998 reform and to cross-listing by the company on
the United States market. We expect a positive reaction from the market to both of these
events, resulting in higher share prices and higher returns to investors and higher Tobin’s Q
values for firms that cross-list in the United States and for all firms following the 1998
corporate governance reform.
However, results for Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c (Table 6, Columns 4 and 5) indicate that
from the market’s point of view, there is no statistical evidence that cross-listing in the United
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States results in higher firm value. The only statistically significant coefficient estimate for
these models is a positive value (0.286, t value of 8.25) for β2 in Model 4 indicating that
Italian companies, on average, experienced an increase in their Tobin’s Q values after the
1998 Draghi reform. Contrary to previous research, (Doidge et al. 2004), our results do not
show an increase a firm’s Tobin’s Q value after cross-listing in the United States (coefficient
β8 is not statistically different from zero). Our results may be different from prior studies
because the number of Italian companies who cross-list in the United States has increased
over time during the period used in our sample, and ignoring the effect of the Draghi reform
on a company’s Tobin’s Q value might lead to the conclusion that the increase in Tobin’s Q is
due to the cross-listing decision. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, other studies in this area
have included companies from many countries and failing to control for fundamental
institutional changes could lead to different results.
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, test another possible explanation for the decision to cross-list in
the United States. Specifically, we examine whether Italian companies decide to cross-list
because they are looking to raise equity capital and they need a capital market more liquid
than their domestic market. We estimate Model (6) to evaluate whether companies increase
their market value and Model (7) to evaluate whether companies increase the number of
shares outstanding following the Draghi reform and/or the cross-listing events. Our results
presented in Table 6, Columns 6 and 7 provide evidence that companies in the sample
decrease the number of shares outstanding after the 1998 Draghi reform (the coefficient β2
estimate for Model (7) is equal to –40.129, t value of 1.94), while the data show no changes
either in the market value or in the number of shares outstanding before/after the cross-listing.
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Overall, these results indicate that Italian firms are not increasing their shares outstanding as
would be expected if companies cross-list in order to gain access to a more liquid capital
market.
Lastly, our results for Model (3), where the dependent variable is the leverage ratio of the
company, confirm that there is no change in the source of company financing associated with
the two events considered in the paper (indeed, the estimates of the coefficients of interest, β2
and β8, are not statistically different from zero). Companies do not switch from debt financing
to equity financing, or vice-versa, after either a cross-listing event or the 1998 Draghi reform.
Results for Model (3), together with evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, show that Italian
companies in the sample do not cross-list in the United States market to raise equity capital;
indeed, (i) the number of shares outstanding, (ii) the market value calculated as the number of
shares outstanding times the price on the market, (iii) and the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets do not change, on average, after the cross-listing.
Our overall results show that once we take into consideration the institutional reform
introduced in 1998, there is no evidence of an increase in the company’s market value or in
the value delivered to investors, nor is there evidence that companies, on average, cross-list
their shares in the United States market to raise more capital. However, our results do
confirm the bonding hypothesis as the explanation for cross-listing a firm’s shares in the
capital market of a country characterized by higher shareholder protection in order to show
investors the company’s commitment to voluntarily enforce policies more favorable to the
interests of minority shareholders.
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5.1 Further Analyses
In conclusion, we provide two additional empirical results that help to corroborate our
findings. First, we evaluated whether the 1998 Draghi reform makes a difference in the
decision to cross-list Italian firm’s shares on the US market. For this analysis, we compare
the number and the value of shares of Italian companies exchanged in the US market from
1991 to 2005 with the number and value of shares exchanged on the US market for companies
from other Western Europe countries.
[Insert Graph 1 about here]
Graph 1 shows (a) the number of shares and (b) the value (in U.S. dollars) of the total
annual trade in Italian ADRs. It is apparent that there was a dramatic drop in (a) the number
of shares traded after 1998, while (b) the value of shares traded shows a decline starting
before 1998.22 We compare the number and the value of shares of Italian companies traded in
the United States with the total number and the total value of traded shares of Western
European companies, to test if the significant drop highlighted in Graph 1 is common to all
Western European countries or if it only occurred for Italian companies.
We estimate the model:
Volt = α + β 0Valuet + β1 After 98 + β 2Valuet * After 98 , and
Valt = α + β 0Volumet + β1 After 98 + β 2Volumet * After 98

(4)
(4b)

for both Italian and Western European companies. If the 1998 Draghi reform signals a
turning point in the historic trends for both the number of ADRs traded in the United States
market and their value, then we would expect a negative and significant coefficient β2 for the
22

Source: Citigroup Depositary Receipt Services (http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp).
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regression including Italian companies, but not for the regression including Western European
companies.
[Insert Table 7 about here]

Our results included in Table 7 show that 1998 is a turning point in the annual data trend for
both the number and the value of shares of Italian companies traded on United States
Exchanges. As expected, the interaction coefficient (β2) is, indeed, negative and significant
for the Italian market data, while the coefficient is not statistically different from zero for the
Western European market data.
Based on the above results, we cannot infer a cause-effect relation between the 1998
Draghi reform and the decline in the number and value of Italian ADRs listed on United
States stock exchanges. However, the results conform to the story that our previous data
indicate: Italian companies cross-listed ADRs in the United States market not to raise equity
capital, not to deliver higher value to investors or to increase the market value of the
company, but to signal their quality to the market and to bond themselves to a higher
shareholder legal protection environment. Since after the 1998 Draghi reform the quality
signaling incentive no longer exists, because the domestic market offers a higher protection
for the minority shareholders, the decision to cross-list ADRs in the United States market is
less frequent.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
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Second, we compare the number of ADR programs that went active/inactive in the period
1998 through 2002 vs. 2002 through 2007 for Italian and Western European companies. In
July 2002 the United States Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which, overall,
increased the costs of compliance with United States regulations for both United States and
foreign companies listed on United States stock exchanges.

Because of SOX, previous

literature found evidence that after 2002 the number of foreign companies seeking to cross-list
their shares in the United States market decreased (Zhu et al. 2007). However, if, as we
argue in this study, the 1998 Draghi Reform constituted a turning point in the incentives for
Italian companies to cross-list, then we would expect a decrease in the number of Italian
companies cross-listing starting in 1998, and not in 2002 as for the rest of the sample. Indeed,
as Table 7 shows, we found a 2.6% increase in the number of new Western European ADR
programs that started between 1998 and 2002, while during the same period Italian ADR
programs decreased by 11.8% (going from 34 to 30). Conversely, for the period 2002 – 2007,
the number of Western European ADR programs decreased by 20.4%, while the number of
Italian ADR programs stayed constant.23 Again, without providing a cause-effect relation,
these results are consistent with the other evidence presented in the paper that Italian
companies cross-list more for quality signaling reasons than for economic or capital raising
motivations.

23

Nine new Italian ADR program started between 2002 and 2007, while six went inactive. However, in August
2007, the FIAT Group announced its intention to delist its three ADR programs from the NYSE, effective 90
days from the communication to the SEC (http://www.reuters.com/article/tnBasicIndustriesSP/idUSN0334245020070803), reducing the number of new active ADR programs for the period to six.
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6. Conclusions and future research
Overall, our results indicate that when shareholder protection is low, cross-listing in
the United States can serve, and it is effectively used by Italian companies, to bond to a higher
shareholder protection environment. Moreover, Italian cross-listed companies (i) decrease the
amount paid in dividends after the cross-listing, and (ii) increase the cash holding ratio,
confirming the bonding hypothesis.

However, when a country institutes a corporate

governance reform that improves minority shareholder protection domestically, this bonding
motivation to cross-list no longer exists or is greatly reduced. These results suggest a public
policy implication that domestic market or government corporate governance reforms can be
used to reduce companies’ incentives to cross-list. We further find that, contrary to prior
research, increasing shareholder value and accessing capital are not significant motivators in
the decision of Italian firms to cross-list in the United States either before or after the 1998
corporate governance reform.

6.1 Strengths and Limitations
This study contributes to the stream of research analyzing the consequences of crosslisting in the United States market. A key assumption of the paper is that the United States
legal environment better guarantees minority shareholders’ rights than does the Italian legal
system. Previous literature provides strong evidence supporting this assumption, as
highlighted in the theory section above.
We acknowledge there are certain limitations in this study. One limitation is that the
small sample may not provide enough scope to detect differences in actual returns to investors
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for the two groups of firms (firms that did or did not cross-list in the United States). This
limitation, however, would make it less likely to find statistically significant differences in our
results.

6.2 Implications
The results of the paper may help firms to better understand the benefits and limitations of
cross-listing and bonding to an environment offering higher shareholder protection. The
focus of the paper, indeed, is on the benefits related to the reduction of the agency costs
associated with the asymmetry between ownership rights and cash flow rights. Presently,
firms know how to compute the costs associated with cross-listing, but they are less able to
quantify and identify the benefits provided by cross-listing, other than the possibility of
accessing a more liquid capital market. This paper also provides governments with some
evidence that improving corporate governance domestically may prevent companies from
cross-listing their shares in countries with stronger corporate governance environments.

6.3 Future Research
It would be interesting to extend the current study to other countries (country by country
and across multiple countries) to verify whether the different legal environments and different
corporate governance systems are significant factors in the cross-listing decision, as previous
theory suggests. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to analyze and isolate the likely
different motivations between companies that decide to list their shares on a United States
organized exchange (NYSE, American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ) – level II and III ADR, 35

versus companies that decide to expand into the US capital market without registering with
the SEC – level I ADR - whose shares are traded by Institutional investors in the OTC
Bulletin Board or Pink Sheet trading system.
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Table 1
List of Italian companies with ADRs listed on United States stock exchanges
Issuer
Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane, SpA.
Banca Commerciale Italiana
Banca Popolare di Brescia S.C.
Bastogi IRBS
Benetton Group SpA
Bulgari SpA
Credito Italiano
De Rigo SpA
Ducati Motor Holding SpA
Enel SpA
Eni SpA
Eridania Z.N, SpA
Esaote Biomedica
Fiat SpA
Fiat SpA
Fiat SpA
Fila Holding SpA
Gentium SpA
Industrie Natuzzi SpA
Instituto Mobilaire Italiano SpA
Instrumentation Laboratory SpA
Interpump Group SpA
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, SpA
Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni, SpA
Italcementi Fabriche Riunite
Luxottica Group SpA
Mediaset SpA
Mediaset SpA
Montedison SpA
Montedison SpA
Olivetti & C. SpA (Ord)
Parmalat Finanziaria SpA
Pirelli SpA
SAES Getters SpA
Sanpaolo IMI SpA
Simint SpA
Simint SpA
SNIA Viscosa
Societa Italiana Distribuzione Moderna SpA
STET

Active Listed Exchange
A
A
A
A
A
A
I
I
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
I
A
A
I
I
A
I
I
A
A
I
A
I
I
A
A
A
I
A
I
I
A
A
I

5/18/98
3/10/94
10/1/97
12/31/86
1/1/87
7/6/95
12/21/93
10/19/95
3/19/99
3/31/06
12/5/95
12/31/86
6/20/96
1/1/89
1/1/89
1/1/89
6/1/93
6/16/05
5/13/93
2/16/94
10/28/96
6/1/99
6/3/97
7/6/94
6/30/89
1/1/90
6/30/04
1/19/05
1/1/91
1/1/91
12/31/86
8/9/96
11/12/91
5/29/96
11/1/98
6/1/92
6/1/92
6/29/89
6/30/89
7/30/91
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MSCI Industry

PORTAL Transportation - Airlines
PORTAL Banking
PORTAL Banking
OTC Real Estate
NYSE Textiles & Apparel
PORTAL Recreation, Other Consumer Goods
PORTAL Banking
NYSE Misc. Materials & Commodities
NYSE Automobiles
NYSE Utilities - Electrical & Gas
NYSE Energy Sources
OTC Food & Household Products
PORTAL Health & Personal Care
NYSE Automobiles
NYSE Automobiles
NYSE Automobiles
NYSE Recreation, Other Consumer Goods
NASDAQ Chemicals
NYSE Appliances & Household Durables
NYSE Banking
NASDAQ Health & Personal Care
PORTAL Machinery & Engineering
PORTAL Banking
NYSE Insurance
OTC Building Materials & Components
NYSE Health & Personal Care
PORTAL Broadcasting & Publishing
OTC Broadcasting & Publishing
NYSE Multi-Industry
NYSE Multi-Industry
OTC Data Processing & Reproduction
PORTAL Food & Household Products
OTC Industrial Components
NASDAQ Misc. Materials & Commodities
NYSE Banking
OTC Textiles & Apparel
OTC Textiles & Apparel
OTC Multi-Industry
OTC Merchandising/Retail
PORTAL Telecommunications

STET
STET
STET
Telecom Italia SpA
Telecom Italia SpA
UniCredito SpA (formerly: Credito Italiano)

I
I
I
A
A
A

12/31/86
OTC
7/27/95
NYSE
7/27/95
NYSE
7/27/95
NYSE
7/27/95
NYSE
12/21/93 PORTAL

Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications
Banking

This table lists companies with ADRs on the United States markets from 1993 to 2005, based on data
from the Citigroup Depositary Receipt Services (http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp).
Different classes of shares of the same company are listed here as different ADR programs (i.e., FIAT
S.P.A. cross-lists 3 different ADR programs). Each class of shares assigns to the shareholder different
voting and cash flow rights (similarly to class A and B shares in the U.S.).
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Table 2
Capital Raising Events for Italian ADRs listed on United States stock exchanges
Issuer
Event Date # Of Shares USD Price USD Value
Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane, SpA
5/18/98
4,000
80.85
323,400
Banca Commerciale Italiana
3/10/94
2,476,200
32.05
79,362,210
Banca Commerciale Italiana
8/17/94
31,250
19.12
597,500
Banca Popolare di Brescia S.C.
10/1/97
20,000
28.41
568,200
Benetton Group SpA
2/1/94
5,500,000
31.41 172,755,000
Bulgari SpA
7/6/95
770,000
5.32
4,096,400
Credito Italiano
12/21/93
1,478,000
18.42
27,224,760
De Rigo SpA
10/19/95
8,900,000
16.00 142,400,000
Ducati Motor Holding SpA
3/19/99
980,030
31.67
31,037,550
Enel SpA
11/5/99
3,467,000
45.23 156,803,396
Eni SpA
12/5/95
26,381,038
32.88 867,408,529
Eni SpA
10/28/96
14,500,000
46.75 677,875,000
Eni SpA
7/8/97
13,600,000
56.50 768,400,000
Eni SpA
7/7/98
3,658,900
63.96 234,023,244
Esaote Biomedica
6/20/96
190,000
25.19
4,786,100
Fila Holding SpA
6/1/93
7,500,000
18.00 135,000,000
Fila Holding SpA
10/27/95
4,837,500
39.00 188,662,500
Gentium SpA
6/16/05
2,700,000
9.00
24,300,000
Industrie Natuzzi SpA
5/13/93
9,660,000
15.00 144,900,000
Industrie Natuzzi SpA
7/20/94
3,080,000
27.38
84,315,000
Instituto Mobilaire Italiano SpA
2/16/94
6,922,445
19.24 133,187,842
Instrumentation Laboratory SpA
10/28/96
5,264,889
12.00
63,178,668
Instrumentation Laboratory SpA
6/16/98
6,585,390
1.42
9,351,254
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, SpA.
6/3/97
33,769
25.51
861,447
Istituto Nazionale Delle Assicurazioni, SpA
7/6/94
9,227,300
15.25 140,716,325
Mediaset SpA
7/12/96
367,000
45.75
16,790,250
SAES Getters SpA
5/21/96
3,082,476
17.00
52,402,092
STET
7/30/91
55,000,000
Telecom Italia SpA
10/29/97
5,000,000
64.68 323,400,000
Total
4,539,726,667

This table lists companies with capital raising events from 1993 to 2005 on the United States markets,
based on data from the Citigroup Depositary Receipt Services
(http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp).
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Overall Sample
Variable

Obs

Mean

ADR Sample
Std. Dev.

Obs

No ADR Sample

Mean

Std. Dev.

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

SalesEU

2299 2,990,000,000 8,750,000,000 171 12,800,000,000 19,600,000,000 2127 2,210,000,000 6,610,000,000

NetIncEU

2298

CaEU

2341 2,300,000,000 7,430,000,000 173 9,730,000,000 17,500,000,000 2168 1,700,000,000 5,530,000,000

GoodEU

2293

RetEarEU

2290

97,800,000

715,000,000 170

258,000,000

1,490,000,000 2120

85,000,000

611,000,000

Growth

2041

0.4450

8.1244 166

0.1183

0.6449 1875

0.4739

8.4738

MktVal

2119 1,490,000,000 6,380,000,000 169 5,020,000,000 13,700,000,000 1950 1,180,000,000 5,190,000,000

MktValAdj

1365 1,460,000,000 6,280,000,000

TobinQ

2296

1.5007

TobinQQ

1352

1.0382

0.4880

CrossListUS

2345

0.0738

0.2615 173

1.0000

After98

2346

0.7123

0.4528 173

CrossListUSAfter 2345

0.0546

Divratio

2053

LogCashRatio
DiffShare

66,700,000

628,000,000 171

145,000,000

399,000,000 2,440,000,000 170 1,880,000,000

NA

1,810,000,000 2127

6,160,000,000 2123

405,000,000

280,000,000 1,790,000,000

NA

NA

1.5232

13.9200

NA

NA

0.0000 2172

0.0000

0.0000

0.7399

0.4400 2172

0.7099

0.4539

0.2272 173

0.7399

0.4400 2172

0.0000

0.0000

0.0079

0.0180 166

0.0052

0.0117 1887

0.0081

0.0184

2271

-7.7716

1.9704 171

-6.5998

2.0986 2100

-7.8670

1.9290

1283

-1.6845

NA

NA

13.3931 171

1.2210
NA

574.0340

NA

NA

60,400,000

0.7393 2125
NA

NA

2089
0.1671
1.3715 164
0.2829
1.2667 1925
0.1572
1.3800
Retwithout
Variables definition: SalesEU is total sales in euro. NetIncEU is net income in euro. CaEU is current assets in euro. GoodEU is goodwill in euro. RetEarEU is
retained earnings in euro. Growth is calculated as the increase in sales between year t-1 and t, divided total sales for year t-1. MktVal is equal to total shares
outstanding times the price of a share at the end of the year (in euro). MktValAdj is market value adjusted (total shares outstanding adjusted for cross split/reverse split
times price per share adjusted for emission of new shares/merges at the end of the year in euro). TobinQ is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book
value of total assets: market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (total shares outstanding multiplied by the
price per share outstanding) less the sum of book value of common equity. TobinQQ is calculated as the TobinQ variable, but using the adjusted values for prices and
number of shares outstanding. CrossListUS is a binary variable equal to 1 if shares of the company are listed on a United States stock exchange, 0 otherwise. After98
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the year is 1998 or after, zero otherwise. CrossListUSAfter is the interaction term between After98 and CrossListUS, it is equal to one
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for the companies with ADRs listed in a United States stock exchange after 1998, zero otherwise. Divratio is dividend ratio, calculated as the ratio of total dividend
payments to total asset. LogCashRatio is the log of the ratio of total cash to total assets minus cash. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. DiffShare is
equal to the increase/decrease in shares outstanding (adjusted value) between year t-1 and year t. Retwithout is the return to investors without dividends (computed as
Retwithout=(Pt-Pt-1)-1. NA indicates that we did not calculate or analyze these values as part of this paper.
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Table 4
Panel A: Correlation Table
DivRatio NetIncEU Growth CrossListUSAfter CaEU GoodEU RetEarEU MktVal TobinQ
1
DivRatio
0.134
1
NetIncEU
0.003
1
-0.013
Growth
-0.045
0.074
-0.009
1
CrossListUS
-0.057
0.078
0.039
0.286
1
CaEU
0.202
0.230
0.171 0.366
1
-0.041
GoodEU
0.192
0.446 -0.004
0.065 0.155
0.078
1
RetEarEU
0.218
0.629
0.070
0.164 0.256
0.272
0.523
1
MktVal
0.043
0.049
-0.008 -0.063
-0.028
0.035
0.208
1
0.166
TobinQ

Panel B: Collinearity Diagnostics Table
Variable

VIF

Square VIF

Tolerance

Squared

DivRatio

1.10

1.05

0.9104

0.0896

NetincEU

1.78

1.33

0.5626

0.4374

Growth

1.07

1.03

0.9358

0.0642

CrosslistUS

1.11

1.05

0.901

0.0981

CaEU

1.31

1.14

0.7645

0.2355

GoodEU

1.30

1.14

0.7673

0.2327

RetEarEU

1.46

1.21

0.6828

0.3172

MktVal

2.25

1.50

0.4441

0.5559

TobinQ

1.10

1.05

0.9059

0.0941

Mean VIF

1.39

Variables definition: Divratio is dividend ratio, calculated as the ratio of total dividend payments to total
assets. NetIncEU is net income in euro. Growth is calculated as increase in sales between year t-1 and t,
divided total sales for year t-1. CrossListUS is a binary variable equal to 1 if shares of the company are
listed on a United States stock exchange, 0 otherwise. After98 is a binary variable equal to 1 if the year is
1998 or after, zero otherwise. CaEU is current assets in euro. GoodEU is goodwill in euro. RetEarEU is
retained earnings in euro. MktVal is equal to total shares outstanding times the price per share on the
market at the end of the year (in euro). TobinQ is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book
value of total assets: market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value
of common stock (total shares outstanding multiplied by price per share outstanding) less the sum of book
value of common equity. CrossListUSAfter is the interaction term between After98 and CrossListUS, it is
equal to one for the companies with ADRs listed in a Unites States stock exchange after 1998, zero
otherwise.
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Table 5
Panel A: Univariate results comparing before/after the 1998 reform
Pearson
chi2 +
(p value)
3.4892
(0.062)

Hypotheses
1. Div. Ratio

Before 98
Mean
0.00865

After 98
Mean
0.00543

t value
(p value)
-3.4484
(.0003)

Before 98
Median
0.01199 *

After 98
Median
0.01351 *

2. Log Cash Ratio

-7.32148

-7.94287

6.7818
(0.000)

-7.60997

-8.12423

27.8002
(0.000)

3. Retwithout

0.22112

0.14647

1.1118
(0.1332)

-0.00084 *

0.01992 *

1.2287
(0.268)

4. TobinQ ♦

0.98175

1.31346

-6.2010
(0.000)

0.89504

1.05569

129.0449
(0.000)

5. Diff Share •

-3.3459
0.0085 *
0.2275 *
4.3212
(0.038)
(0.0004)
*
: Because the median value for both groups is equal to zero, we calculate the median values presented in
this table excluding zero.
+
: We obtain Pearson chi square values by splitting equally between the two groups the values equal to the
median.
♦
: We omit the outliers with TobinQ values larger than 600. We obtain qualitatively the same results
winsorizing the variable TobinQ to account for outliers (.9787 vs. 1.2623 means, t value of –8.7208, pvalue of 0.000).
•
: Calculated using the adjusted price and share sample.
-73.00248

38.31250

Panel B: Univariate results comparing cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms
Pearson
chi2+
(p value)
0.0133
(0.908)

ADRs
Mean
0.005189

Non ADRs
Mean
0.00813

t value
(p value)
2.0203
(0.0217)

ADRs
Median
0.00931 *

Non ADRs
Median
0.13510 *

2. Log Cash
Ratio

-6.59984

-7.86700

-8.2042
(0.000)

-7.08553

-8.03719

30.1750
(0.000)

3. Retwithout

0.15718

.28292

-1.1271
(0.1299)

-0.00190 *

0.01735

0.4722
(0.492)

4. TobinQ ♦

1.22103

1.22236

0.0145
(0.5058)

0.99230

0.98877

0.0063
(0.937)

5. Diff Share •

127.5499

-16.50553

-2.7378
(0.0031)

0.27976 *

0.09700 *

9.0853
(0.003)

Hypotheses
1. Div. Ratio

*

: Because the median value for both groups is equal to zero, we calculate the median values presented in this table
excluding zero.
+
: We obtain Pearson chi square values by splitting equally between the two groups the values equal to the median.
♦
: We omit the outliers with TobinQ values larger than 600. We obtain qualitatively the same results winsorizing
the variable TobinQ to account for outliers (.9787 vs. 1.2623 means, t value of –8.7208, p-value of 0.000).
•
: Calculated using the adjusted price and share sample.
Variables definition: see Table 3 above
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Table 6
OLS Regressions
Dependent = α + β 0 NetIncEU + β1Growth + β 2 After 98 + β 3CaEU + β 4GoodEU +

β5 Re tEarEU + β 6 MktVal + β 7TobinQ + β8CrossListUS + β 9CrossListUS * After
(1)
(2)
(3)
Divratio LogCashRatio Leverage
0.000
0.000
-0.000
(1.63)
(3.02)**
(3.06)**
-0.004
-0.000
-0.000
Growth
(0.61)
(1.23)
(1.17)
0.001
-0.447
-0.010
After98
(3.16)**
(0.74)
(0.56)
0.000
0.000
-0.000
CaEU
(3.08)**
(0.62) (11.81)**
-0.000
0.000
0.000
GoodEU
(0.50)
(0.12)
(1.73)
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
RetEarEU
(0.91)
(1.26)
(1.97)*
-0.000
-0.000
0.000
MktVal
(0.62)
(1.12)
(1.02)
0.004
0.126
-0.046
TobinQ
(4.42)**
(1.38)
(5.65)**
-0.006
1.657
-0.029
CrossListUS
(2.80)**
(3.52)**
(0.85)
0.004
-0.437
0.034
CrossListUS*After98
(1.40)
(0.83)
(0.92)
0.003
-7.791
0.683
Constant
(47.33)** (43.55)**
(2.11)*
1407
1391
1407
Observations
Dep Variable
NetIncEU

46

(4)
(5)
TobinQ Retwithout
-0.000
0.000
(3.21)**
(2.45)*
0.001
0.001
(0.46)
(2.60)**
0.286
-0.286
(8.25)**
(1.68)
-0.000
0.000
(6.52)**
(1.07)
-0.000
-0.000
(3.62)**
(0.83)
-0.000
-0.000
(2.64)**
(1.71)
0.000
-0.000
(4.75)**
(1.25)
0.168
(2.63)**
0.393
-0.204
(1.64)
(1.07)
-0.400
0.303
(1.57)
(1.41)
1.106
0.146
(39.09)**
(0.70)
1407
1316

(6)
(7)
MktVal
Diffshare
6.923
-0.000
(7.12)**
(1.76)
19176649.424
13.956
(1.38)
(9.99)**
56392115.926
-40.129
(0.32)
(1.94)*
0.166
-0.000
(3.39)**
(0.82)
0.489
0.000
(2.58)**
(2.19)*
1.057
-0.000
(2.04)*
(0.34)
0.000
(1.26)
1.184e+09
37.675
(6.24)**
(1.31)
4.518e+08
-14.555
(0.68)
(0.40)
1.197e+09
-24.931
(1.29)
(0.34)
-1.252e+09
-5.312
(4.68)**
(0.15)
1407
1383

R-squared

0.05

0.05

0.09

0.08

0.02

0.67

0.22

Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Variables definition: Dependent, the dependent variable, is equal to Divratio in column (1), LogCashRatio in column (2), Leverage in column (3), TobinQ in
column (4), Retwithout in column (5), MktVal in column (6), and Diffshare in column (7). Divratio is dividend ratio, calculated as the ratio of total dividend
payments to total assets. LogCashRatio is the log of the ratio of total cash to total assets minus cash. Leverage is calculated as total liabilities divided by total
assets. TobinQ is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets: market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets
plus the market value of common stock (total shares outstanding multiplied by the price per share outstanding) less the sum of book value of common equity,
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Untabulated results show qualitatively similar results for value of TobinQ non-winsorized. RetWithout is the return to
investors without dividends (computed as Retwithout=(Pt-Pt-1)-1. Untabulated results show qualitatively similar results if we adopt returns to investors including
dividends. Diffshare is the difference in the number of shares outstanding between year t and year t-1 for company i. NetIncEU is net income in euro. Growth
is calculated as increase in sales between year t-1 and t, divided total sales for year t-1. After98 is a binary variable equal to 1 if the year is 1998 or after 1998,
zero otherwise. CaEU is current assets in euro. GoodEU is goodwill in euro. RetEarEU is retained earnings in euro. MktVal is equal to total shares
outstanding times the price per share on the market at the end of the year (in euro). TobinQ is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of
total assets: market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (total shares outstanding multiplied by the
price per share outstanding) less the sum of book value of common equity, windsorized at the top and bottom 1% to control for outliers. CrossListUS is a
indicator variable equal to 1 if shares of the company are cross-listed for the year on a United States stock exchange, 0 otherwise. The standard errors/t-statistics
are calculated adopting the White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity adjustment.
Columns (1) and (2) provide results for the first hypothesis in the paper, Column (3) shows results testing if companies after cross-listing and/or the 1998 reform
changed their financing habits, switching from equity to debt or vice-versa. Columns (4) and (5) show the results for the model testing the second hypothesis of
the paper. Untabulated results provide qualitative similar results adopting as a dependent variable the non-windsorized value of TobinQ or the return to investors
including dividends. Finally, Columns (5) and (6) show results for the model testing the third hypothesis in the paper.
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Table 7
Number of shares vs. Value of Italian/Western European ADR exchange in the US, 1991-2005
a) Volt = α + β 0Valuet + β1 After 98 + β 2Valuet * After 98 and
b) Valt = α + β 0Volumet + β1 After 98 + β 2Volumet * After 98

After98
Vol Italy
Vol Italy*After98
Value Italy
Value Italy*After98
Vol W Europe
Vol W Europe*After98
Value W Europe
Value W Europe*After98
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
Value Italy Volume Italy Value W Europe Volume W Europe
4.381e+09 97082814.313
2.550e+11
1.080e+10
(2.07)
(2.18)
(1.09)
(2.90)*
38.371
(7.47)**
-35.724
(2.14)*
0.024
(7.46)**
-0.022
(2.12)*
46.598
(2.72)*
-29.817
(1.40)
0.020
(2.49)*
-0.011
(1.11)
-5.818e+08 21453938.292
-5.514e+10
1.485e+09
(0.96)
(1.61)
(0.52)
(0.77)
15
15
15
15
0.85
0.85
0.75
0.89

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Where: After98 is a indicator variable equal to 1 for years after 1998, 0 otherwise. Vol Italy is the total number of ADRs
exchanged annually on United States stock exchanges. Value Italy is the value (number times the price per share) of Italian
ADRs exchanged annually on United States stock exchanges. Vol W Europe is the total number of ADRs for Western
European companies exchanged annually on United States stock exchanges. Value W Europe is the value of Western
European ADRs exchanged annually on United States stock exchanges. Column (1) reports results for the OLS estimation of
Model b for Italy; Column (2) reports results for the OLS estimation of Model a for Italy; Column (3) reports the OLS
estimation of Model b for Western Europe; and Column (4) reports results for the OLS estimation of Model a for Western
Europe.
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Table 8
Number of ADR Programs for Italy and Western Europe for the periods 1998-2002 and 2003-2007

W Europe
Italy

# of
ADR
1997
(1)
768
34

# of ADR
went inactive
1998- 2002
(2)
280
8

# of ADR
went active
1998-2002
(3)
300
4

Total

%
change

(4)
788
30

(5)
+2.6%
-11.8%

# of ADR
went inactive
2003-2007
(6)
280
6

# of ADR
went active
2003-2007
(7)
119
9 – Fiat 324

Total at the
end of 2007
(8)
627
30

% change
compared
with 2002
(9)
-20.4%
0%

Column (1) shows the number of ADR programs from Western Europe and Italy, respectively, at the end of 1997. Column (2) shows the number of ADR
programs that went inactive during the period 1998-2002, and Column (3) the number of ADR programs that went active over the same period. Column (4)
presents the total number of ADR programs at the end of December, 2002, and Column (5) the % variation. Similarly, the rest of the table provides information
about the number of ADR programs that went inactive (Column 6) and active (Column 7) between 2003 and 2007 for both Western European and Italian
companies, with the total at the end of October, 2007 (Column 8) and the % variation (Column 9).
Source: Citibank ADR Website, data at Oct. 18, 2007.
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Nine new Italian ADR program started between 2002 and 2007, while six went inactive. However, in August 2007, the FIAT Group announced its intention to
delist its three ADR programs from the NYSE, effective 90 days from the communication to the SEC (http://www.reuters.com/article/tnBasicIndustriesSP/idUSN0334245020070803), reducing the number of new active ADR programs for the period to six.
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Graph 1
Time series trading data
Number of shares and value of share in $ of Italian ADRs listed on United States stock exchanges

These graphs include the total number of shares and value (in U.S. $) of Italian ADRs exchanged in the United States
markets each year from 1991 to 2005. Source: Citigroup Depositary Receipt Services
(http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp).
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